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World-wide international economic policies during the last few decades have shown a rising interest 
in regional integration in various new forms. Not only has the number of regional integration 
arrangements expanded, but, even more strikingly, their scope and depth have advanced in a 
spectacular manner.  
 
The analysis of such experiences would be very important for the development of further integration 
initiatives in the framework of the CU/SES/EAEU as well as for the design of efficient and sustainable 
integration policies in the Eurasian Economic Union. The questions of creating common and 
coordinated policies beyond trade will be the most important for the first years in EAEU. Apart from 
the complex regulatory and governance issues in alternative integration arrangements, other 
challenges facing the integration on the wider European and Eurasian economic space relate to 
geopolitical, economic and sectoral heterogeneities in the region. Assuming that the current frictions 
between Russia and the EU can be resolved, the future trade linkages and other forms of integration 
between the EU and the EAEU could become an important factor in shaping the Eurasian regional 
economic development. 
 
Any classification of regional economic integration arrangements is based on the different levels or 
degrees of integration: from the elimination of tariffs and non-tariff barriers for goods (traditional FTA), 
to the establishment of a common customs tariff (CU), from the freedom of movement of goods only 
to liberalizing services, as well as the flow of capital and people and, finally, to policy harmonization 
and the regulatory unification (DCFTA, Single Market, etc). The research and expert communities are 
now challenged to provide solid, independent and comprehensive analysis and advice to policy-makers 
on the plausible future scenarios and optimal schemes of economic integration within the EAEU, as 
well as between the EAEU and its strategic partners, notably the EU. 
 
In order to foster interdisciplinary and international dialogue on the topic, the 2d workshop on trade 
policy regomes invited distinguished scientists, policymakers and business representatives from all 
over the world, including Andrey Slepnev, Member of the       Board – Minister in charge of Trade, 
Eurasian Economic Commission; Peter Balas, Deputy Director General, DG Trade, European 
Commission; Stephan Nolte, Senior Economist, DG Trade, European Commission (EC), Pavel Kabat, 
Director General and Chief Executive Officer, IIASA; Evgeny Vinokurov, Director, Centre for Integration 
Studies, Eurasian Development Bank; Alexander Knobel, Head, Foreign Trade Department, Gaidar 
Institute for Economic Policy (Gaidar Institute), Natalia Volchkova, Policy Director, Center for Economic 
and Financial Research, Assistant Professor, New Economic School, Rahim Oshakbaev, First Deputy 
Chairman of the Board, National Chamber of Entrepreneurs of Kazakhstan, Stefan Meister, Senior 
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Policy Fellow, European Council of Foreign Relations, among many others, with a total of 45 
participants. 
 
Thus, the aim of the workshop was to challenge research and expert communities to provide solid, 
independent and comprehensive support to policy-making on plausible future scenarios and optimal 
schemes of economic integration within the EAEU, and between the EAEU and its strategic partners. 
It should be noted, however, that the timing of the workshop has turned out as less than optimal: it 
coincided with the introduction of the second wave of major sanctions by Western countries, including 
the EU, against Russia due to the escalating military conflict in the Eastern part of Ukraine. This fact 
has much influenced the discussion, making it clear that even if the political events are outside the 
scope of the work of researchers, these still very much influence the possibilities of elaborating realistic 
solutions and advices, and even more, putting those to practical use.  
 
1. Global Picture. Modern trends in regional integration 
The significance of inter-regionalism - i.e., integration between regional blocs - is rising rapidly. The 
establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) will add one more initiative to the small but 
increasing family of inter-regional agreements1. Once the political problems are resolved, the EU and 
the EAEU will have a chance to focus on the long-term prospects for deeper economic integration in 
which their common neighbors would also play an important role. Under such a positive scenario all 
parties could work together towards launching the process of trade liberalization and integration 
structures on the Eurasian continent. For its ultimate success, scientifically solid evidence to support 
policy-makers on their decisions on integration should be provided by the international expert 
community. Complex analysis combining different methodologies, both qualitative and quantitative, 
is necessary to create such convincing evidence. 
 
The global attempts to further liberalize world trade have basically stalled2. The Doha Round launched 
by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 even after15 years failed to achieve a major 
breakthrough in the core negotiating objective of improving market access3. At the same time the 
majority of countries have become seriously interested in advancing their trade linkages or, more 
ambitiously, economic integration - at least with their preferred trade partners. The result therefore 
has been a proliferation of bilateral and regional free trade agreements. In the absence of global 
solutions in this manner the international trade structures are being transformed in ways reflecting 
the interests of the countries participating in the regional initiatives.  Thus, there are the following big 
regional integration associations in the world: Economic and Monetary Unions (the  European Union 
(EC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Organization of Eastern Caribbean States 
(OECS), CFA-Franc-Zone, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS);  Customs unions 
(The Customs Union of Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan (BRK-CU), the Southern Common Market 
(MERCOSUR), the East African Community, the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf 
(GCC), the Southern African Customs Union (SACU)); general markets (the European Economic Area 
(EEA); Central American Common Market (CACM), the Andean Community (CAN), Caribbean 
                                                          
1 Evgeny Vinokurov brief at the beginning of the workshop 
2 Summary of the background paper distributed in the meeting: Havlik, Kabat, Rovenskaya, Vinokurov: “European Union and 
Eurasian  Economic Union: Scientific Support for Economic Integration” 
3 Michael Emerson background paper “European Trade Policy Issues” 
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Community and Common Market (CARICOM); and  Free trade zones (the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Community (APEC), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Latin American Integration 
Association (ALADI-LAIA), The African Union (AU), the Central European Free Trade Association (CEFTA), 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 
South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA),the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).  
 
Several types of trade liberalization and integration models exist, such as bilateral free trade 
agreements, regional integration blocks and inter-regional integration agreements. The first model, i.e. 
bilateral free trade agreements are the most numerous. As of July 2016 the WTO recorded 635 bilateral 
free trade agreements (FTA). A majority of these cover just free trade in goods, while an increasing 
number cover trade in services, too. The most recent ones also cover – to varying extent - the other 2 
freedoms, the movement of capital and people. Only a small number are even more ambitious, i.e. 
becoming customs unions4.  
 
The second model means the formation of regional integration blocs, of which the European Union is 
the most prominent example. Other examples of economic integration (though mostly not customs 
unions) are the Mercosur group (seems to be failing) in South America, the 10-member ASEAN group 
in South-east Asia, the NAFTA agreement between the US, Mexico and Canada and the most recent 
example is the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia (BKR), established in 2010.  
 
The third model includes inter-regional integration agreements. One of the most impressive versions 
are such inter-continental processes as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Trans-Atlantic Trade 
and Investment Process (TTIP). The TPP will bring together the US, much of the East and South-East 
Asian region and the Western shores of the Pacific (China excluded), while the TTIP would cover the 
Trans-Atlantic, i.e. the largest trade flow in the world, which is currently negotiated between the US 
and EU.  Both agreements strive to further liberalize a large percentage of world trade in the Atlantic 
and Pacific regions. Another variety of potential inter-regionalism is a bloc-to-bloc one, which in 
principle entails the most complex of negotiating processes. There are no precedents for this as yet. 
More generally, shifting from the level of individual countries to regional and inter-regional blocs in 
international economic policy is a new trend in the 21st century. It can be referred to as ‘Regionalism 
2.0’, where the institutional linkages among blocs and large countries may reduce the importance of 
the WTO. In any case, it is evident that a variety of inter-regionalism will continue to proliferate, 
making the global trade and investment system increasingly multi-layered and complex.  
 
                                                          
4 According to WTO data, as of 1st July 2016, some 635 notifications of RTAs (counting goods, services and accessions 
separately) had been received by the GATT/WTO. Of these, 423 were in force. These WTO figures correspond to 460 physical 
RTAs (counting goods, services and accessions together), of which 267 are currently in force. 
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2.  The European Union 
The European Union (EU) is an association of 28 sovereign member states – though with the outcome 
of the recent UK referendum its membership will drop to 275.  12 states are founding members: 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, and the United Kingdom. In 1995, Austria, Finland and Sweden entered the EU. Cyprus, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined in 
2004. Bulgaria and Romania joined in 2007. Croatia acceded in 2013. Official candidate states include 
Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey. Morocco's application was rejected by the EEC, 
Iceland's application has been withdrawn by the government and Switzerland's is frozen, while Norway 
rejected membership in two referendums.  
 
The decision to form an Economic and Monetary Union was taken by the European Council in the 
Dutch city of Maastricht in December 1991, and was later enshrined in the Treaty on European Union 
(the Maastricht Treaty). Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) represents a major step in the 
integration of EU economies. It involves the coordination of economic and fiscal policies, a common 
monetary policy, and a common currency, the euro. Whilst all 28 EU Member States take part in the 
economic union, some countries have taken integration further and adopted the euro. Together, these 
countries make up the euro area. The Economic and Monetary Union takes the EU one step further in 
its process of economic integration, which started in 1957 when it was founded. This level of economic 
integration involves the coordination of economic policy-making between Member States; the 
coordination of fiscal policies, notably through limits on government debt and deficit; independent 
monetary policy run by the European Central Bank (ECB); single rules and supervision of financial 
Institutions within the euro area and the single currency and the euro area.6 The European Union (EU) 
has implemented a geographically more dispersed trade policy recently, focusing on bilateral and 
regional FTAs.7 The driving forces for this are two-fold. One is the failure of the Doha Round, the other 
is the current economic situation of the EU countries. The slow economic growth acts as an incentive 
for pursuing more active trade policies, thereby also improving the competitiveness of the EU Member 
States. The expansion and deepening of its trade agreements with virtually the whole of the rest of 
the technologically advanced world is motivated from this perspective. 
 
The EU is currently negotiating several preferential trade agreements with countries in different parts 
of the world. There are intensive integration processes in Europe, too. Alexander Knobel described the 
following forms of cooperation between EU and the other economies in Europe: 
• Between the EU, Norway and Iceland: the European Economic Area (EEA). This ensures access 
for these countries to most areas of the EU’s Internal Market, based on their harmonization 
with the EU’s regulations. Reflecting the specific interests and sensitivity of the fishery as well 
as the agricultural sectors, those are excluded from the EEA. The relationship also involves 
substantial contribution to the EU’s budget. 
                                                          
5 The United Kingdom intends to withdraw from the European Union. This process is commonly known as Brexit. As a result 
of a June 2016 referendum in which 51.9% of UK’s citizen voted to leave the EU. This separation process is compl ex, 
generating political and economic changes for the UK and other countries. 
6 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/emu/index_en.htm 
7 Michael Emerson presentation material for the workshop 
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• Between EU and Switzerland: a network of bilateral Sectoral Agreements (the same approach 
as in the case of cooperation between MERCOSUR and Chile). The implementation of the 
Bilateral Agreements occurs taking into account Switzerland’ specific interest in some areas 
especially in the banking sector. It should be noted that this relationship is at present under 
serious strain due to a Swiss referendum which resulted in the rejection of a major plank of 
the Internal Market, the free flow of persons. 
• Between the EU, Eastern Europe countries and South Caucasus countries: Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement, Action Plans under European Neighborhood Policy, EU project 
«Eastern Partnership»: Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, (Armenia subsequently opted for 
joining the EAEU). 
• Between the EU and Mediterranean countries: Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement, 
Action Plans under European Neighborhood Policy: Tunisia, Morocco, Israel. Movement 
towards the shortest possible integration on both sides: creation of a Comprehensive Euro-
Mediterranean Free Trade Area 
• Between EU and Balkan States: disequilibrium format towards full accession, between EU and 
Balkan States: Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro. 
Disequilibrium state in the long term either continues as cooperation without accession, or 
passes into full membership. 
One of the recent completed processes is the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements 
(DCFTAs) signed with three East European countries (Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) in June 27th 2014.  
The negotiations are going on with China as well, but in a limited format. China and the EU are subject 
currently only negotiating an investment agreement8.  
The Emerson background paper describes the four EU trade agreement models: 
• Simple classical FTA with suppression of tariffs and quantitative restrictions (Ukraine 
agreement) 
• Deeper FTA with reduced technical barriers to trade (Korea FTA) 
• More comprehensive FTA with convergence of regulatory standards and eliminations of non-
tariff barriers (TTIP) 
• Asymmetrical agreements with much smaller countries/areas such as the EU-Turkey Customs 
union, where Turkey adapts to the EU regulatory standards “as if” a full member.  The 
European Economic Area (EEA) integrates such countries as Norway to the union via the full 
acceptance of the EU single market law, but without customs union implications. The one third 
of all existing asymmetrical models are DCFTAs, that leads gradually towards EEA type of trade 
agreement, if needed.   
 
2.1. The EU and the Eastern Partnership  
The European Union established a new concept for trade collaboration with the former Soviet bloc 
countries in May 2009. The Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative was directed at six countries of Eastern 
Europe and the South Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. The 
initiative aimed at tightening the relationship between the EU and the Eastern partners by deepening 
their political co-operation and economic integration.  
                                                          
8 Michael Emerson’s background paper ”European Trade Policy Issues” 
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Out of the six EaP countries three, Georgia, 
Moldova and Ukraine 9  signed a Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with the 
EU in June 2014. 10  Meanwhile, in September 
2013 Armenia, that was included in the 
negotiations, withdrew from the process and 
decided to join the EAEU instead.11  Belarus also 
joined the EAEU and made a decision to 
integrate into the CU by signing a treaty for the 
Customs Union with Russia and Kazakhstan in 
2010.   Azerbaijan is a part of the initial setting, 
but the country does not meet the precondition 
for starting the negotiations, which is WTO 
membership12. 
According to Emerson and Gylfason 13  these 
agreements go way beyond the simple ‘classical’ 
FTA model, and cover a large number of EU 
regulations applicable at the Internal Market.  
Picture x: Bayramov described the same 
taxonomy as an upside-down pyramid membership  
 
The basic pattern according to Emerson is gradual convergence to the EU regulatory regime, but with 
a spectrum of variations as regards the degree of strictness of the obligations and the length of the 
transition periods.  
 
On the one hand, there are many EU directives and regulations, which the partner states ‘will’ within 
a certain time scale adopt (transpose) into their own domestic legislation. On the other hand, there 
are some areas where the partner state can request a lengthening of the implementation deadlines if 
considered necessary. There are some other areas that are subject to far looser language, with the 
partner state pledging ‘best endeavors’ for ‘gradually moving towards compliance with EU standards’. 
Emerson stated in his presentation that the DCFTAs contain no promises of future EU membership, 
despite the fact that all three states concerned declared it as their long-term objective. 
 
Gyfalson mentioned that on the whole, the EaP countries lag behind EU Member States in terms of 
key economic and other performance indicators that are conducive to trade and growth as well as 
being desirable in themselves: e.g. democracy, free press, functioning markets, ease of doing business, 
                                                          
9 The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement between The EU and Ukraine entered into force on 1 January 2016, 
as part of their broader Association Agreement (AA). The rest of the Association Agreement, containing political and 
cooperation provisions, has already been provisionally applied since November 2014 
10 European Union http://www.easternpartnership.org/content/eastern-partnership-glance 
11 Thorvaldur Gylfason background paper p. 3 
12 http://www.easternpartnership.org 
13 Michael Emerson background paper “European Trade Policy Issues” and Thorvaldur Gylfason background paper “Can and 
Should the EU’s Eastern Partnership be Saved” presented in the workshop 
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governance, interpersonal trust. He added that stronger performance in these areas would encourage 
trade and growth. 
 
Natalya Volchkova and her team of the New Economic School have analyzed several variations of the 
potential trade agreements between the European Union and former Soviet Union member countries, 
the EU and the CU integration, focusing on the impacts of the non-trade barriers on trade between 
the EU and Armenia, Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan.  Their results show that in terms of GDP only 
the EU-28 will enjoy benefits. The GDP loss would be the largest in case of Ukraine, representing 2,9% 
of its GDP. Armenia would have increased its exports as well as Georgia and Azerbaijan14.  But it is 
essential to note that the changes compared to the base-line scenario are relatively small. 
 
Thorvaldur Gylfason presented the results of the study that compares two options: integration with 
the CU or FTA’s with the EU for these countries.  Gylfason’s report concluded that the gains justified 
the signing of the DFTAs. His results substantially diverge from those of Volchkova’s study15 and show 
significantly higher benefits of the DCFTAs for Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan. The paper shows that 
overall as a result of the DFTAs with the EU the Eastern Partnership states gain significantly from the 
free trade. 
Valeriy Heyets16 made the general comment concerning the DFTAs that the reaction of Russia was a 
challenge. Russia claims that its interests may potentially be harmed, because the DFTAs may cause a 
flood of EU products entering Russia through the EaP countries. However, according to Heyets this is 
not possible as Russia is legally authorized to take measures in case of fraud concerning the origin of 
products.  Emerson commented on the same issue by stating that the structure of the current import 
from the EU countries makes this kind of transit flows almost impossible, due the fact that the imports 
to a large extent consist mainly of distinctive branded consumer goods.  
 
Peter Havlik told that the DCFTA negotiations should have been more transparent and focus only 
selectively on costly harmonization (not full ‘acquis takeover’ without accession prospects). The UA-
EU DCFTA, like all the other similar agreements, are incompatible with membership in the Eurasian 
Customs Union. Thus, it is not advantageous for Ukraine to be put before an “either/or” choice: both 
the EU and CU integration vectors are needed if one looks at the map and history17. 
 
2.2 The EU and Ukraine 
 
The EU and the Ukraine ratified the DFTA in mid-September of 201418, while on January 1, 2016, the 
agreement has entered into force (for the EU side, started to be “provisionally applied”). (It should be 
noted that Ukraine has been a member of WTO since May 2008.19) 
 
                                                          
14 Natalya Vokchkova presentation material for the workshop 
15 The majority of the work of reported by Gylfason was conducted in 2013 and does not have information of the outcomes 
of the DFTA’s signed in  June 2014 and the EEU agreement in July 2014 
16 Valeriy Heyets presentation material for the workshop 





Valery Heyets analyzed the effects of the UA-EU DCFTA and presented both the advantages and the 
risks for each of the Ukrainian sectors analyzed. According to his report the benefitting sectors are: 
agriculture, ferrous metallurgy, wood working and food processing industries (via increasing 
investments), as well as the energy sector (if the technical regulations are implemented in a right way), 
furthermore transport (railways infrastructure investments). The sectors that may be affected by the 
Agreement are financial services, the labor market and machine building.20 According to Heyets the 
investments into environmental protection cost more than 20 billion euros. There are also many 
problems in other sectors of Ukraine’s economy. In his view the opening up of the European market 
and signing of the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement (EAA) were important steps towards further 
integration into the global economy. Sufficient conditions for the success of this task include the 
solution of a set of problems, such as ensuring positive changes in the structure of the Ukraine’s 
economy and corresponding structural reforms. As of today, Ukraine’s economic integration is 
characterized by the absence of broad productive and technological ties with the EU countries, 
because Ukraine’s exports mainly products of low degree of procession. At the same time, the EU 
exports to Ukraine is mainly goods with higher value added.  
 
According to some of the Russian decision-makers, the bureaucracy of Ukraine is not efficient enough 
to enforce rules of origin or other non-tariff barriers. Ukraine will lose a lot of the economic and 
industrial cooperation with Russia due to the Association with the EU. In their view the main risks of 
the DCFTA for Ukraine are the decreasing living standards in Ukraine during the transition period, and 
the requirements of fast implementation of the new technical regulations, thus the implementation 
of the agreement is challenging. For example, the modernization of the railway transportation 
foreseen by the Agreement, changing to the European narrow-gauge track, in Europe took 21 years 
and Ukraine should solve this problem now during 8 years. However, the EU participants pointed out 
that this was one of the numerous examples of erroneous statements about the DCFFA: in reality the 
Agreement does not require at all the change of the technical characteristics of the partner countries’ 
railway systems. In order to ensure a substantive and realistic discussion the Russian and other 
interested experts should study more deeply the DCFTA, the actual commitments taken by Ukraine 
and other EaP partners. 
 
3.   The Customs Union and the Eurasian Economic Union 
 
The most recent example of modern regional integration is the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan 
and Russia that was established in 2010. On January 1, 2012 the three states formed a Single Economic 
Space to promote further their economic integration. (It has been replaced by the Eurasian Economic 
Union (EAEU) since January 1, 2015.) The EAEU aims at a higher degree of economic integration 
modeled in some respects on the EU experience. 21 The EAEU will reach full scope by 2025. Azerbaijan 
has not been formally invited to the EAEU, but both parties are interested in investigating the 
opportunity.22 
 
                                                          
 
21 Anastasia Stepanova (2013). ‘Eurasian Union and Ukraine‘. Monography, Moscow, Russia (In Russian) 
22 Sergey Lavrov interview in June 2014 in http://voiceofrussia.com  
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Andrey Slepnev called attention to the fact that the new WTO members and candidate countries have 
some concerns about the WTO process23.  According to the experience of Ukraine the hopes attached 
to the new prospects opened by accession to WTO were not realistic. Russia was also hoping that the 
membership in the WTO would open new perspectives but it led to new problems to be handled by 
the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO concerning, e.g.  the EU’s 3rd energy package.  In his 
view membership made trade more difficult, including crisis and other economic problems. He claimed 
that political considerations in this process were stronger than economic ones. There are many 
problems for domestic agricultural enterprises which mostly suffered losses after Russia joined the 
WTO. Of course the CU members are the main trade partners for Russia, while there are lot of concerns 
about the new reality and the level of relations with the EU (dispute settlement under WTO for 3rd 
energy package). 
 
For Russia it would not be acceptable to create a deep FTA between the CU and the EU at this stage. 
There have to be a platform for such a decision, it has to be based on WTO rules. Within 3-5 years the 
situation could be different, therefore it is important to create now a new level of cooperation and 
trust. Kyrgyzstan will have a special situation with its neighbor, China. Furthermore, in case of 
Kyrgyzstan joins to the EAEU (what in between has actually happened), there will be needed some 
special adjustment of the EAEU rules, due the high volumes of imports from China. 
 
Sara Alpysbaeva presented an analysis of the integration processes with the Customs Union mainly 
from Kazakhstan perspective24 but covered the impacts on Russia and Belarus, as well. She added that 
the EAEU had a WTO challenge. By 2015 Kazakhstan should be a WTO member also25. The WTO will 
require explanation about questions such as the non-membership of Belarus and Azerbaijan. 
   
Natalya Volchkova told in her presentation that the regional trade integration initiatives of the CU 
include negotiations with Israel, Vietnam, India, and the Republic of Korea, as well. The driver of the 
Eurasian trade agreement’s development is naturally the strong global regional integration, but 
according to Suvi Kansikas the trade policy and economic instruments to promote political interests 
are becoming one of the elements of the CU foreign policy. Kansikas also paid much attention to the 
historical perspective about experiences of COMECON. According to him it shows that there was a 
need for a new view on Russia’s integration policy as well as the history of integration, which is not 
very long, having started in 1991. These policies are different towards different neighbors, such as 
Kazakhstan and Belarus. The experiences of the COMECON are also important to understand the 
position of the EU. The EU needs to find new ways of cooperation and overcome Cold War rivalry. 
However, the COMECON might not be a good example for comparison as it is an example from a very 
different economic system26.  
According to Alexander Knobel, the Customs Union and Russia have an opportunity to keep 
"leadership" among the countries of the former Soviet Union – in the process of their movement 
towards the European Union: sooner or later most of the countries will choose this direction, but 
                                                          
23 Andrey Slepnev introductory in the workshop, based on Peter Havlik and Nadejda Komendantova minutes  
24 Sara Alpysbaeva presentation material for the workshop 
25 Armenia and Kyrgyzstan joined the EAEU in January 2016. Kazakhstan became a member of a WTO on 30 November 2015. 
Russia joined WTO on 22 August 2012. The Kyrgyz Republic has been a member of WTO since 20 December 1998. Armenia 
joined a WTO 5 February 2003. 
26 Suvi Kansikas presentation material for the workshop 
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Russia/Kazakhstan will act more as observers, rather than leaders of the movement to Europe. Internal 
redistribution mechanisms have to be developed within the EAEU: for example, for the purposes of 
temporary correction of proportions of distribution of incomes from customs duties. He mentioned 
that it was also necessary to consider oil and gas balance: the prize of Belarus is obvious. Transfer from 
Russian budget system to Belorussian economy is ~$6–8 billion per year (~10-12% of Belorussian GDP). 
 
Péter Balás gave a summary of EU trade policies and spelt out in detail the EU’s views concerning the 
relationship with Russia and the EAEU. First of all, he stressed the very negative impact of the 
deepening Ukrainian political crisis which acted as a general brake on the relationship with Russia and 
led to the introduction of economic sanctions. Until and unless this crisis is resolved in an agreed, 
satisfactory manner, it is not possible to seriously talk about the maintenance, even less the 
development of cooperative attitude towards Russia, and as a consequence, the Russian-led EAEU. A 
second negative factor is the recent trade policy of Russia, in particular as a new member of the WTO. 
Russia might consider its trade performance disappointing since joining the WTO, but this is not due 
to the WTO rules, rather to the lack of competitiveness in many sectors. If Russia has problems with 
such aspects of the EU’s regulatory regime as the 3rd Energy Package, the EU has much more 
complaints about the overall direction of Russia’s trade policies and particular measures. These include 
the non-respect of Russia’s tariff commitments, the introduction of various non-tariff barriers, 
including the recent import ban on the imports of pigs and pork from the EU. The efforts to settle these 
frictions through bilateral talks have not brought results, which led the EU to the unprecedented step 
of launching or considering several WTO dispute settlement cases against Russia, in spite of being a 
new WTO member. (It should be noted that in between the WTO mechanism decided in favor of the 
EU in some cases, while others are still being processed.) Summing up, while it’d really serve the 
interests of all sides to develop cooperation with Russia and the EAEU, the EU has both important 
political and economic preconditions, while the current tendencies were moving rather in a negative 
direction.  
  
Saltanat Tamenova stated in her presentation that the foreign economic relations are a catalyst for 
economic transformation. Trade agreements restructure the economy and the market and their 
dynamics and contribute to the accumulation of capital. According to her, during the years of 
Kazakhstan’s independence substantial progress has been made in the liberalization of the economy, 
in the related legislation and in the government support to the exporters. Temenova’s team’s analysis 
of the country's foreign trade activity showed that serious structural imperfections still exist and they 
have continued to cause problems to the national economy.  Still, they came to the conclusion that in 
the period 2012-2013 the volumes of imported goods has increased due joining the CU, even if the 
direct macroeconomic changes are still small.27 As an example of the CU trade benefits Tamenova 
presented the evolution of the raw material prices. Due to the domination of Russia in the raw material 
market of Kazakhstan, the trade of raw material is not as volatile as on the global markets.28  She added 
that properly chosen monetary and exchange rate policies during the integration process are of high 
importance for Kazakhstan’s foreign economic policy. 
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Sara Alpysbaeva presented evaluation of effects of integration processes within the SES on the 
economy of Kazakhstan. The key findings of her study from the Kazakhstan perspective can be 
summarized into a set of conclusions within three markets: first, the role of the CU trade is not 
significant for Kazakhstan, the significance decreased during the period studied.  Second, the migration 
flow was negative (outflow of labor) and the impact was stronger on Kazakhstan than other countries. 
Thirdly money transfers from Kazakhstan to the CU countries was almost 10 times higher than 
transfers to Kazakhstan during the period analyzed29.  The more detailed analysis of the key sectors 
showed controversial results. From the Kazakhstan perspective the overall openness of the economy 
did not change much: in 2010 the index of mutual openness of the Kazakh economy with the CU 
decreased from 0.6% (2010) to 0.41% (2012) and no significant signs of convergence can be observed. 
  
The Eurasian Economic Commission has studied the effects of the integration of the Customs Union 
with Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia.  The study presented by Andrey Lipin shows that import from 
the rest of the world is more sensitive to price changes than from the CU. Belarus’ production is most 
oriented to Russian demand. He added that the Russian production is less sensitive to CU import price 
changes because of scale. Lipin and his colleagues evaluated the impact of non-tariff barriers on trade 
flows in the Customs Union as well. By asymmetric barriers Lipin refers to the situation where a trade 
barrier is implemented at least by one CU member to others and there is at least one CU country that 
does not implement the very same barrier. Or the same applies to the trade between a CU country 
and the rest of the world (RoW)30.  The results of the Eurasian Economic Commission study show that 
the reduction of non-tariff barriers can operate as a source of the efficiency increase within the CU 
and may lead to an increase in output and productivity. 
 
3.1 The CU and Azerbaijan 
Vugar Bayramov 31  stated that there was a need for a better understanding of the impacts of 
Azerbaijan’s accession to the Custom Union.  Russia is the major trade partner for Azerbaijan, so there 
is a need to eliminate trade barriers. The maximum(?) import tariff in Azerbaijan is currently 15%, 
compared  to a 8% average, and if the country will sign trade agreement with the EAEU, it will decrease 
its import tariffs.  
  
Vugar Bayramov presented another study that has analysed the implications of the potential accession 
of Azerbaijan to the CU which includes both the stakeholder and sector specific analyses.  The aim of 
the study was to assess the potential economic benefits Azerbaijan would have gained if it had joined 
the CU already in 2010. Although the Center for Economic and Social Development (CESD) analysis 
showed a number of quantitative benefits of accession (for example, an additional two to five percent 
growth in GDP), the qualitative analysis revealed some disadvantages.  Azerbaijan’s agriculture sector 
would have lost most of its competitiveness, and the independence of Azerbaijan’s energy policy 
should have been given up.  
 
As Bayramov stated, as an energy exporting country Azerbaijan should have an independent energy 
policy. This is also required by the current trade landscape of the country. It is the largest economy in 
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the region and its main source of export incomes are oil and gas. Currently Azerbaijan has only 15% of 
its export, which is non-oil, going to EU. 85% of its non-oil export goes to Russia, and the question is 
how it matches with the Custom Union philosophy. Even if the independence of the energy policy 
would not be a problem, an independent external tariff might not be acceptable within the CU rules.  
The negotiations with WTO are also complex as Azerbaijan applied for the membership already in 1997 
but due the major role of agricultural subsidies is willing to join only with the status of a developing 
country, otherwise it should undertake major cuts of subsidies to agriculture.   
 
3.2 Enterprise level cooperation  
Hans Holzhacker has studied the impact of the EAEU from as enterprise perspective.  He stated that 
the size of the enterprises plays an important role as an engine for economic growth.  Despite some 
growth.  the share of(?) the EAEU countries is still tiny in global non-energy, non-metals exports. The 
combined share of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan corresponds to Ireland’s and is smaller than that of 
Austria. The Eurasian economic integration should help increase EAEU’s global exports, not only 
exports within the integration. According to Holzhacker trade is essential, because according to the 
latest research exporting firms are larger than non-exporting ones. The EAEU’s non-energy, non-metal 
firms are mostly relatively small. The question arises whether firm size itself could be a policy variable32.   
However, Holshacker’s research team believes that facilitating firms’ concentration should also play a 
role. For the EAEU countries and particularly their non-energy, non-metal sectors’ history matters: 
public support in line with the “resources based view” is probably needed but might be highly 
ineffective due to weak institutions. Interestingly, the Eurasian Economic Union agreement signed on 
29 May 2014 has not a lot to say about cooperation in the fields of R&D and technology transfer. 
However, Kazakhstan, for example, recently has 
come forward with a second 5-year plan within 
the government’s “enhanced industrialization 
and innovation” framework, obviously relying on 
the “resource- based view”.  One of the 
Holshacker’s recommendations was to conduct 
active policy; better M&A and bankruptcy and 
labor market legislation and practice.  
 
Leena Ilmola and Nadejda Komendantova 
presented the results of the first phase of their 
study that has surveyed the perception of foreign 
companies on the trade barriers in the CU33.  
Picture x: The interviewed foreign business leaders did not mention the trade tariffs  
or the recent economic integration as a challenge from corporate perspective.  
 
The research that was prepared in collaboration with Anastasia Stepanova, focused on a better 
understanding of the trade integration’s impacts on business decision-making and actual corporate 
practices.  The aim of the project, called the “Success in the changing environment of economic 
integration project” was to understand the resilience requirements of corporations when the trade 
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barriers were changing constantly. The pre-study indicated that corporate decision-makers do not 
perceive trade barriers as the most important business challenges. The impact of the trade barriers 
and political risks is transmitted to the business via the overall economic growth within the region. 
Economic growth is the main trigger of business investments.  
  
The EDB Centre for Integration Studies was in the process of conducting a large study that is scanning 
the expectations and experiences of companies within the EAEU. According to Dmitry Korshunov, the 
project has already completed the first phase; the qualitative analysis of international experiences, the 
business surveys, the classification of the list of exceptions, restrictions and non-tariff barriers to 
mutual trade prepared by the Eurasian Economic Commission.  During the second stage the team 
would prepare a quantitative assessment of the corresponding economic effects and prepare policy 
recommendations to be developed by the end of 201434.  
 
4. Drivers of the development of economic integration  
During the workshop many presentations and comments referred to the drivers behind the decision- 
making on the economic integration process. The workshop participants reported close to 20 studies 
which investigated in a way or another either the prerequisites or the impacts of economic integration. 
The methods applied were varied: 
• Multisector CGE model (Volhckova, Korshunov) 
• “New trade theory”, which builds on Melitz’s 2003 (Holzhacker) 
• The integrated qualitative and quantitative approaches such as scenario planning, 
linear regression (Bayramov, Ilmola and Komendantova, Emerson, Kansikas etc.) 
• Gravity model (Gylfason) 
•  
The discussions during the workshop mentioned some drivers that may promote regional trade 
agreements. 
• Politics; situations where the political motivation is pushing the integration process 
forward 
• Need to decrease the conflict potential between neighbor countries 
• Technical standards are seen as a major way to tie the countries together and build 
efficient trade barriers even for smaller markets. 
• Increased competition in the global trade that presents a severe threat to the strategic or 
key industries of the national economies of participating countries 
• Strong lobbying by the industries that benefit from the removal of the regional trade 
barriers 
 
The leading motivation for the world-wide removal of trade barriers is mainly explained by industry 
efficiency and competitiveness claims: 
• Trade barriers support non-efficient industries, their removal will lead to the most efficient 
distribution of resources and production  
• When the political interventions are minimized the predictability of the environment 
(from corporate perspective) will increase 
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• Global level optimization of allocation of resources require free capital and investment 
flows 
• IT technologies decrease the governance and management costs of the global operations, 
thus improving the efficiency of the globally operating companies. 
Thus, removal of the trade barriers leads to higher global growth. 
 
Alexander Libman presented the results of the analysis about the impacts of the economic crises on 
the likelihood of regional integration. According to him the literature assumes that crises should be 
associated with a surge of protectionism35. Decision-makers meet stronger pressure by the growing 
influence of interest groups, beggar-thy-neighbor policies and decline in public support for regionalism. 
Recent studies have suggested, however, that regional integration can advance during periods of crises. 
The reasons behind this apparently contradictory conclusion are several:   
• Crises may challenge the limits of states’ capacity 
• Crises may trigger a need for preserving the existing economic ties which are particularly 
important for the given country 
• Signing of economic integration agreements during the periods of crises may serve as 
informative, signaling to domestic public. etc.  
Libman stated that they were studying how these factors affected the choices with respect to regional 
integration in six cases: two of the EU crises (the crises of the 1970s and of early 2010s); one in Asia 
(the crisis of late 1990s) and three Northern Eurasian crises (the transition recession of early 1990s; 
crisis of late 1990s and of late 2000s). He added that his group was able to demonstrate heterogeneous 
effects that these crises had on regional integration.  
         
As stated in some of the presentations during the workshop, the idea of stable power and trade blocs 
was built during the Cold War period.  In the 21st century the developments of the global system drive 
the trade integration towards more complicated models. Trade blocks have the following common 
features: 
• Increasing complexity of the global trade system 
• Speed of communication, that accelerates the processes of change  
• Stratification of production processes and value chains drive rapid changes of the national 
GDP 
• Volatility of global power politics generate a need for more flexible portfolio of trade 
agreements 
• The recent developments have shown that internal power structures within one country 
may change very fast, and the new decision-makers might have different priorities.   
 
5. European and Eurasian integration perspectives 
Even if the negotiations for a trade agreement between the EU and the CU are on hold right now, the 
scientists of the workshop have elaborated potential impacts of trade agreements to the parties.  
Emerson’s elaboration of the potential collaboration between the EU and the CU can be divided into 
two key challenges. The first one is the FTA (DFTA) negotiations with third parties, the close 
neighboring countries of both the CU and the EU. According to Emerson’s background paper Russia 
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has some concerns about the negotiations between the EU and the neighboring countries; that the 
changes in the trade flows and barriers will lead to a situation where the EU goods end up on the 
Russian market, by trans-shipped through the countries having FTA or DFTA with European Union and 
this will lead to the erosion of Russian industries’ relative competitiveness.36  
 
Peter Balas stressed that it is need to apply a gradual approach. He told that the European Commission 
and DG Trade are closely following the political situation and should the conditions change, it would 
contribute to restarting contacts with CU. Meanwhile, Russia must also fully meet its WTO obligations 
before FTA negotiations with the EU could be even seriously considered. He mentioned that the 
regulatory issues are important factors to take into account during this process37. 
 
Emerson stated that the DFTA agreements keep the door open for the partner countries to conduct 
their trade with the CU countries either under the traditional CIS-based agreement or to define new 
bilateral models for the negotiations about the removal of trade barriers. Even if it is evident that there 
is a strong asymmetry of trade between the EU and Russia, Emerson concluded that the EU-CU FTA 
would generate benefits to consumers and support the modernization of the CU countries’ industries. 
 
The national level results presented by Knobel suggest that the cumulative effect of an FTA with the 
EU on Russia's GDP would be 0.8% in the short run and up to 2.0 % in the long run. Short-term and 
long-term impacts on the GDP of Kazakhstan are lower, 0.6% and 1.2 %, respectively. In contrast to 
the economies of Russia and Kazakhstan, the impact on the economy of Belarus, as it was expected, 
will be minor but not positive.  EU GDP will grow by 0.1% in the short run and by 0.2% in the long run. 
The industry-level analysis (15 industries) conducted his team was looking at the changes in production, 
household consumption, trade and employment. In Russia the production would decrease only in two 
areas in the long run: in the motor vehicles and parts sector and in the wood products and paper sector. 
A similar pattern is observed for Kazakhstan. In Belarus, except for these two industries, the production 
would decrease in agriculture, food industries, as well as in manufacturing.  
The production in the EU would decrease only in the minerals sector, both in the short and in the long 
run. The EU-CU FTA would have positive impact on the households’ consumption in Russia and 
Kazakhstan and in the EU as well (minor change though).  The household consumption in Belarus drops 
in all sectors, in which the production decreases Thus, it is important to note that deeper integration 
between the CU and the EU is possible only after sufficient integration within the CU.38  
The possible integration of two trade blocks should be based on a pragmatic approach, mutual benefits 
and respect of the interests of both parties and their member sovereign states39.  
Laura Solanko mentioned that in CU in 2010 there were common customs tariffs but national non-
tariff barriers. During the next few years by the establishment of the EAEU it is planned to create a 
common electricity market by 2019, while oil and gas market by 2025. The latter deadline is foreseen 
also for a unified financial services market. Solanko also mentioned that the questions of 
harmonization of fiscal policy and of competition policy were not discussed as yet in detail. 
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Coordination will be a challenge and depend on the political benefits. It should be noted that now the 
EU’s trade with KZ, BY (+ Armenia, +) is minimal. 
 
Alexander Shirov presented a related analysis about the implications of an EU-CU FTA with 
competitiveness assessment. His paper prepared with Yantovskiy states that the development of a 
free trade agreement could operate as a source of stable economic growth in the post-Soviet countries. 
But, Shirov also stressed in his presentation that the potential EU-CU FTA was problematic due 
differences in the sector structures and their competitiveness40.  As the measure of competitiveness 
the study analyzed the efficiency of the use of primary resources. The more value-added can be 
produced per unit of primary resources, the higher is the industrial efficiency.41 The results of their 
paper indicate that Russia retains competitiveness within primary commodities, food production, but 
has insufficient competitiveness in all machine-building sectors. 
   
According to Shirov’s presentation it is not expected that even if the EU-CU FTA was signed, it could 
be fully applied at once. The adjustment of the Russian market to a new competitive environment 
would take time.  Thus, in his view a step-by-step FTA scenario with several prerequisites would 
produce a moderately favorable impact on the Russian economy.  The competitive industries that are 
able to compete with EU imports are textile and furniture industries. The non-competitive industries 
are investments goods sectors. The study also states that the prerequisite for technology exchange 
that would benefit both sides is a sufficient level of capital investment (increase of savings ratio). Due 
the issues mentioned above and the challenging negotiations about development of unified energy 
policy, the writers see the FTA negotiations inevitable, but it may take place only in the distant future.  
 
Natalya Volchkova presented the third analysis on a EU- CU FTA.  She confirmed the conclusions of 
Emerson, Knobel and Shirov-Yantovskiy with one condition. According to her analysis42  compared to 
the current situation in case of an FTA involving the EU, the EaP countries and the CU, among the 
Customs Union countries the winners would be Kazakhstan (+2,6 % GDP change) and to a lesser extent, 
Russia, furthermore the EU, while the losers would be Armenia   (-3,4% loss of GDP) Georgia,Azerbaijan, 
Belarus and Moldova.  Volchkova presented one prerequisite for the outcomes described above. 
Russia would benefit from the economic integration only if it takes an active role and shapes the FTA 
and its implementation according to its needs. The efforts will be rewarded; the deeper integration 
brings higher welfare improvement for Russia.  However, it will be always accompanied by a fall of 
production in the industrial sector, and adaptation is only possible if changes in the sector’s structure 
are accepted.  
 
The challenges stressed by the EU representatives at the meeting included the WTO compliance 
requirements if the CU was seriously interested in trade negotiations, and even more, in signing wider 
trade agreements.  This applies to the further negotiations with Belarus-Russia-Kazakhstan Customs 
Union (BRK).  The BRK customs union should, according to the multilateral rules, in case of accession 
of any of its members to the WTO, offer compensation to the adversely affected WTO members by 
                                                          
40 Alexander Shirov and Alexey Yantovsky presentation material for the workshop 
41 Alexander Shirov and Alexey Yantovsky background paper “Estimating a possible timeframe for creation of an FTA between 
European Union and Eurasian Economic Union.” p. 4 
42 Natalya Volchkova presentation material for the workshop 
17 
 
reducing its common external tariffs. 43  This is a challenge between EU and BRK countries, due the 
nature of trade. The EU imports raw materials, while the BRK mainly manufactured goods. Reducing 
the BRK tariffs would have major implications on the competitiveness of the domestic production.  
 
The participants discussed the different types of regional trade integration models and methods. Thus, 
historical examples recognize several types of economic integration: two countries with bilateral 
agreements, currently there are over 400 of such agreements in the world, customs unions, inter-
regional integration agreements such as the currently negotiated Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and potential agreements between blocks such as Eurasian 
integration and the EU. However, neither the European side, nor the Eurasian Economic Union have 
experience in the fourth type of integration and this project could help to design scenarios for such 
processes of deep integration, including in the regulatory area44. Such deep integration can become 
reality only in the medium- to long-term. However, work towards analysis and possibly a gradual 
elimination of regulatory barriers should start already now.  The chain of seven workshops could 
provide recommendations for the negotiations between the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union. 
  
There are many questions about the approaches and methods which should be clarified in order to 
effectively study the possible ways of integration: which focus points, which facts have to be selected 
and which methodologies have to be applied. There are still huge methodological gaps as some models 
cannot catch the elements of integration among companies and it is still unclear how the parts or 
elements affect the entire dynamic of integration and what methodologies are needed to provide a 
long-term analysis. The existing static models should be necessarily replaced by dynamic elements. 
There must be several models to provide robust solutions, which should also include micro-economic 
approach and not only modeling. Climate change intermodal comparison is a standard tool, may be 
the same tool should be applied in work on estimation integration by merging different models45.  
Peter Havlik added that the Pan-European economic integration - from Lisbon to Vladivostok - can be 
a viable strategic option. Instead of erecting new walls and barriers: a closer integration of the enlarged 
EU, Russia and the EaP countries can boost badly needed reforms, stability, trade, investments and 
growth in wider Europe. Do not forget medium and long-term effects. 
In a conclusion Pavel Kabat stated that economic integration within the wider European and Eurasian 
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